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Abstract:
This study provides an empirical assessment of the optimal site area for planned high-
density housing development in Hong Kong. Conventional hedonic pricing methods are
not used because they cannot separate the price effects of site area caused by its amenity
value and by market power. We obtain our estimate from a unique data set containing the
choice of household applicants for the housing units in 128 public housing estates in Hong
Kong between 1990 and 1998. An inverted U-shaped relationship between site area and
popularity of the estate is revealed. We conclude that the land areas of most public housing
estates in Hong Kong are sub-optimal. The optimal housing site area that gives the highest
amenity value is  estimated at  about  24,770 sq.m. This serves  as  a sound quantitative
benchmark for the government in its future disposal of public as well as private housing
land.
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Estimating Optimal Site Area for Planned Residential Development in Hong Kong
I. Introduction
Consider a town planner with a large piece of land to be developed.  Should he allocate the
whole block of land to one single developer?  Or should he divide the land into smaller plots
for different developers?  If the piece of land is to be divided, what is the optimal size of each
development site?   Planning  practitioners  routinely confront  questions  like  these.   In  this
paper, we attempt to shed some light on these questions using empirical evidence from Hong
Kong.
To  accommodate  some  6.8  million  people  within  a  territory  of  less  than  1,100  square
kilometers, housing in Hong Kong primarily takes the form of high-rise building structures. A
typical household occupies a self-contained apartment unit within a building and shares the use
of  elevators  and  other  common facilities.  The  Hong  Kong  government  is  the  monopoly
supplier of land. All private housing land is leasehold and is sold to housing developers by
competitive means through auctions and tenders. After obtaining the land titles, the developers
are responsible for the planning, layout design, and construction of the housing development
subject  to  relevant  government  regulations.   However,  the  total  area  of  each  housing
development  site  is  essentially  a  bureaucratic  decision.  In  the  fiscal  year  1997-1998,  for
example, 19 plots of housing sites were sold through public land sales.  The size of these
housing sites varies enormously, with a range from 88 sq.m. to 91,265 sq.m.  Depending on
the size of the site, each development may contain one to many multi-storey building blocks. 
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Town planners  are generally  in favor of comprehensive planning (Cullingworth & Nadin,
1997; Fainstein & Campbell, 1996).1  This idea is reflected, for instance, in the concept of
“planned  unit  developments”  (PUDs)  in  the  United  States  (Tomioka  & Tomioka,  1984).
Professional  planners  consider  that  comprehensive development by  a single  agent  has  the
advantages of providing greater design flexibility, better neighborhood environment, exclusive
open space, and community facilities for the residents. Such planned development basically
internalizes the externalities in land use (Fischel, 1994). Prospective homebuyers are attracted
not  only  to  these  distinctive  physical  features,  but  also  to  the  possible  higher  value
appreciation of these housing units than in traditional subdivision type of housing development
(Arendt, 1996).
Comprehensive development often requires a larger land area.2   Pushed to the extreme, the
concept of comprehensive development would suggest that it is always optimal to allocate the
whole piece of land to a single developer.  However, just as there are limits to scale economies
in the theory of the firm, there are  limits  to  the gains  from comprehensive development.
Beyond a certain site size, diseconomies of scale from large housing development emerge.
Such diseconomies arise  principally from coordination and project management problems.
The economies and diseconomies of scale in residential housing development ultimately are
reflected in the overall quality, or “amenity value,” of housing.  A better-planned housing
development produces a higher amenity value to its residents.  If economies of scale dominate
when the site area is small while diseconomies of scale dominate when site area is large, we
1 An early version of the U.S. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act included the following note: “A comprehensive
plan: sound planning implies a comprehensive plan. The zoning should be applied to the whole municipality at
once.  Piecemeal  zoning  is  dangerous,  because  it  treats  the  same  kind  of  property  differently  in  the  same
community.” (Bair, 1984:120, fn.1)
2 Land area requirements  for  planned unit  developments  vary from place to  place.  A minimum site  area is
normally specified under the planning law (Levy, 1997:131). For instance, San Francisco City Zoning Ordinance
for planned unit developments required the land parcel to comprise an area of at least 3 acres (about 12,000 sq.m.).
In Lincoln of Massachusetts, the minimum size of the land tract for Open Space Residential Development was 25
acres  (about  101,000  sq.m.)  (Tomioka  &  Tomioka,  1984:154).   In  New  York,  large  scale  planned  unit
developments may extend up to 100 acres (about 405,000 sq.m.) or more (So, 1979:455).
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expect the amenity value of housing to bear an inverted U-shaped relationship with the size of
the development site.  The theory of production identifies the optimal firm size as one that
minimizes the average cost of production.  In this paper, we identify the optimal site area as
one that maximizes the amenity value of the housing development.
The amenity value of housing affects the housing prices. In previous studies, lot size is an
attribute in explaining property values. Larger land lots are found to be proportionally more
expensive (Tabuchi, 1996). The value of a land lot is found to depend both on its absolute size
and on its size relative to the average lot size in its close neighborhood (Asabere & Colwell,
1985).   Optimal  lot  size  and  configuration  are  clearly  important  considerations  from the
property  developer's  perspective in  maximizing profits  from the development,  both in  the
presence (Colwell & Scheu, 1989; Colwell & Scheu, 1998) and in the absence of planning
constraints (Cannaday & Colwell, 1990; Edelson, 1975).  
Past research on site size tends to focus mainly on the impacts of minimum lot size zoning on
property values and on urban sprawl (see Pogodzinski & Sass (1991) for a summary review).
Different model specifications, assumptions and case study areas have, however, led to mixed
findings. Some indicate that minimum lot size restrictions would lead to rising property prices
and, in some instances, to metropolitan expansion (e.g., Abelson, 1997; Bucovetsky, 1984;
Fischel,  1996;  Henderson,  1985;  Moss,  1977;  Pasha,  1995;  Pasha,  1996;  Pollakowski  &
Wachter, 1990). Thorson (1997) also argues that increasing minimum lot size restrictions can
decrease  new housing construction in  the long run,  and thus  potentially  lead to  a  higher
housing price.  In contrast, others argue that the property value effects are ambiguous (Grieson
& White, 1981; White, 1975).  Ohls, Weisberg, & White (1974) indicate that the effect of
minimum lot size on overall land value cannot be determined a priori, but they assert that the
authorities would, in practice, tend to increase land supply and thus lower the costs of single-
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family properties.  Jud's (1980) empirical findings confirm that minimum lot zoning has a
negative impact on residential values.
Most of these studies are, however, not directly applicable to the case of Hong Kong.  Urban
housing lot in Hong Kong refers to the whole development site, not a single-family housing
plot  as  in  the North American setting.   Our  concern is  thus  about  the area  of  the entire
development, rather than the size of its individual subdivision units.  This empirical study
seeks to derive the optimal site area for planned housing development in Hong Kong using
data collected on the preferences of public housing applicants. Following this introduction, the
remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section II discusses why the conventional
method of examining the lot size effects on property prices cannot give an answer to our case,
and explains our alternative approach to estimating the optimal size of housing site in Hong
Kong.  Section III gives our statistical model and Section IV discusses our empirical findings.
The final Section V provides our conclusions and discusses the policy implications.
II. Methodology
If both economies and diseconomies of scale are present in the development of residential
housing sites, we expect there is an optimal site size that strikes the right balance between the
two opposing factors.   Housing located in excessively small or  overly large sites  will  be
relatively unattractive to homebuyers.  Tiny sites are unattractive because they lack the space
to  provide the  ancillary  facilities,  such  as  car  parks,  for  the  residents.  Furthermore,  in  a
compact city  like  Hong Kong,  they result  in  unsightly,  tall  pencil-like  building blocks  in
contiguous sites,  causing undesirable overlooking with each other. However, huge housing
developments are equally unattractive due to monotony and lack of exclusivity. A housing
development that is designed for the average taste may end up pleasing no one. Overcrowding
of residents in the use of the communal facilities can reduce the sense of tranquillity and the
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amenity value of the housing development (Lai, 1993).  How can these different considerations
be quantitatively measured?
The overall quality, or amenity value, of housing is reflected in housing prices.  If the total site
area of a housing development affects the amenity value of housing, then property values are
systematically related to site area.  A hedonic study of housing prices that includes site area as
one of the attributes will  help reveal whether homebuyers prefer to live in large or  small
housing developments.  Such a hedonic analysis of private housing, however, suffers from at
least two problems.  
First, the total area of a site may be systematically related to development cost.  High prices in
a small housing development, for example, may reflect diseconomies in construction costs
rather than consumers' preference for small sites.  This is the classic identification problem
pointed out by (Rosen, 1974).  
Second, site area may also be systematically related to the degree of competition in a housing
market.  Suppose consumers have strong locational preferences, so that the relevant housing
market is confined to a relatively small geographical area.  If land is auctioned in large lots, the
effective number of competing property developers within a geographical area will be small.
To  the  extent  that  fewer  competitors  translate  into  higher  prices,  a  positive  relationship
between housing prices and total site area need not reflect consumers' preference for large
sites.  In other words, site area may affect property prices by its effect on amenity value and by
its effect on market power.  These confounding effects are difficult to isolate.
We sidestep these  problems by  exploiting a  unique data set  provided by  the Hong Kong
Housing  Authority  (hereafter  referred  to  as  Housing  Authority)  on  the  applications  for
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publicly subsidized sale flats  in Hong Kong. Established as  a statutory organization since
1973,  the  Housing  Authority  is  now  the  largest  landlord  in  Hong  Kong.  It  acts  as  the
government's  agent  in  implementing  the  public  housing  program  and  currently  provides
accommodation for over half of the local population. It is responsible for planning, developing,
allocating and managing public sector housing, which includes both subsidized rental and sale
units. The government provides land and financing to the Housing Authority on concessionary
terms to meet the public housing production targets. With the various forms of government
subsidies, the housing rents and prices of these public housing units are much lower than full
market values. Households have to meet certain demographic characteristics, income limits
and resale restrictions before they are eligible to apply for these public housing units.  Table 1
shows some basic facts about public versus private housing in Hong Kong.
Table 1     Housing characteristics in Hong Kong, 1998
Public
Permanent
Housing
Private
Permanent
Housing
All
Permanent
Housing
Number of Dwellings (‘000) 948 1056 2004
Population Share (%)(1) 50.3 47.7 98.0
Average Household Size (persons) 3.5 3.1 -
Home Ownership Rate (%)(2) 29 72 52
Data source: Hong Kong Housing Authority, Housing in Figures, 1998 edition. 
Notes:
(1) These figures exclude population in temporary housing.
(2) The figures are provisional estimates in the Fiscal Year 1998/1999 of the government.
Our  estimate  of  optimal  housing  site  area  is  based  on  the  preferences  indicated  by  the
applicants for the publicly subsidized sale units. All these units were sold at a discount from
the full market value. The majority of them came from the Home Ownership Scheme, but a
few units  belonged to  other  subsidized sale housing programs such as  the Private Sector
Participation Scheme administered  by  the Housing  Authority.  For  all  these  programs,  the
Housing Authority periodically conducts an allocation exercise (referred to as a “phase”) of its
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housing stock.  Flats from several different housing estates are made available for application
in each phase, and applicants are requested to indicate their preferred choice of up to four
estates. Successful applicants are drawn by random lottery, and their final selection of flats
does not depend on the preferences stated on their application forms.
We  assume  that  the  preferences  stated  on  the  application  forms  are  the  applicants'  true
preferences.  Since these priority orderings have no effect on the actual allocation of flats,
there is no strategic motive for the applicants to misrepresent their preferences in order to
improve their chances of success.  Given our assumption, the popularity of an estate (i.e., the
number of times an estate is cited as a preferred choice in the application forms) is directly
related to factors that enhance the value of housing.  For example, if a larger site area of the
estate increases the amenity value of a housing unit, larger estate will be more popular.  The
subsequent analysis confirms that more desirable housing sites (e.g., those in urban areas) tend
to be more popular.  This increases our confidence that the stated preferences are not arbitrary,
even though they do not directly affect housing choice.
The pricing of these sale flats is determined in terms of a discount on the market value of
comparable private housing units. At its call for applications, the Housing Authority publicly
announces  the  rates  of  housing  price  discount.  Development  costs  do  not  figure  in  this
calculation. Housing costs and hence the degree of public subsidies vary in accordance with
the different types of public housing, rather than the size of the estates (Chiu, 1997; Yu, 1997).
Thus, even if there are economies or diseconomies in construction costs associated with large
sites, they are not reflected in prices and hence have no effect on the popularity of a public
housing estate.  The relationship between site size and popularity primarily reveals the demand
factor rather than the supply factor. Using the popularity of these public sale housing estates
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instead of private housing prices as the dependent variable of analysis therefore avoids the
identification problem in hedonic pricing studies.
Furthermore the purpose of the Housing Authority is not to maximize profits, but to subsidize
homebuyers. Even if larger development sites do reduce the degree of competition, we do not
expect the Housing Authority to wield its market power by raising prices in larger estates.
The confounding effects of amenity value and market power are therefore isolated.  If there is
a relationship between site size and the popularity of subsidized housing sale estates, such a
relationship reflects the amenity value effect rather than the market power effect.
III. Statistical Model
We have been provided with data on the preferences for the subsidized sale housing estates
indicated by the applicants for the period 1990 to 1998. Similar data for earlier periods are not
available in the Housing Authority.  Let  Yi  be the number of times that estate  i  is cited as a
preferred choice by applicants in a certain phase of allocation. Because the total number of
public housing applicants varies greatly across different phases, we normalize this variable by
calculating the popularity share,  yi = Yi /  j Yj, where the summation is taken over all the
housing estates that are available within the same phase.
We model popularity share as a function of total site area and other variables.  The unit of
observation is a public housing estate in a given phase of allocation.  In particular, we let
yi = f(xi) + zi + ei.
In this model,  zi  represents a vector of variables that are expected to affect popularity share,
and   is the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated.  These variables include the
average price per sq.m. of floor area (in constant 1998 dollars), the percentage discount from
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market value, the number of flats from the estate available for allocation in a given phase (as a
fraction of the total number of flats available in that phase), dummy variables for location, and
dummy variables for allocation phase.  By introducing the phase dummy variables, any phase-
specific factor that affects popularity share is controlled.
The main variable of interest is  xi, the total area of the estate. Since a priori reasoning cannot
determine the relationship between site size and popularity share, we let this relationship be
represented  by  a  sufficiently  flexible  function,  represented by   f(xi),  and use  the  data  to
determine the best fit.  Empirically, this is implemented by estimating a polynomial of degree
5, and successively removing the higher-order terms that are statistically insignificant.  If the
resulting function is increasing in  xi, one would conclude that larger sites increase amenity
value.  If  f(xi)  is decreasing, one would conclude that larger sites reduce amenity value.  If the
function first increases and then decreases, the optimal site size is identified by the point at
which  f(xi)  reaches its peak.
Finally, note that the popularity shares of different housing estates in the same phase may be
correlated with each other.  Since the independence assumption fails for the error term  ei,
standard errors from ordinary least squares regressions are wrong.  Based on the procedures
developed by White (1982), our statistical analysis will use robust standard errors that allow
for correlation of error terms within a phase.
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IV. Empirical Data and Findings
Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis.  The data set
contains information on 130 housing estates over 24 phases of housing allocation. The site
area variable refers to the total area of the development site.  In some cases, two or more
housing estates may share the same site.  Records of these housing estates will be considered
as separate observations.
Table 2. Summary statistics of all variables in the model
Variable
Mean       Std. Dev.       Min        Max
Popularity share (%) 17.043 9.589 1 55
Site area (,000 sq.m.) 20.244 15.975 2.724 87.800
Real price (HK$,000/sq.m.) 19.261 5.392 9.322 35.393
Discount (%)   41.923 6.379 30 50
Share of flats (%) 17.692 10.631 1.812 56.279
Hong Kong Island 0.177 0.383 0 1
Kowloon 0.262 0.441 0 1
New Territories with rail 0.177 0.383 0 1
New Territories without rail 0.385 0.488 0 1
It is possible to obtain more disaggregated data on the preferences of different categories of
applicants.  However, Table 3 shows that their preferences are highly similar, as indicated by a
high  degree  of  cross  correlation  in  the  popularity  shares  of  different  housing  estates  for
different groups of applicants. For this reason, our analysis focuses only on the popularity
share computed from all applicants of the Scheme.
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Table 3. Correlation among the choice of different categories of applicants
   priority 1    priority 2    green   white  non-white   total 
priority 1 1
priority 2 0.7852 1
green form 0.7106 0.8431 1
white form 0.6084 0.7328 0.7981 1
non-white form 0.6241 0.7124 0.7973 0.9184 1
total 0.6456 0.7534 0.8411 0.8661 0.8451 1
Before estimating the statistical model, it is useful to take a look at the main variables of interest,
popularity share and site area. In Figure 1, we show a scatter plot of these two variables.  We have
also added a smoothing spline to the plot to aid the visualization (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1990).  One
can see that popularity share is loosely related to site area.  An increase in site area tends to raise
popularity initially and lower it beyond a certain size.  There are two obvious outliers in the data
set.  Tin Shing Court (Phase I and Phase II) has a total site area of about 87,800 sq.m., which
exceeds the next largest development site by 65 percent.  Since these two outliers will have a large
leverage on the parametric estimation of the functional form of  f(xi), they are dropped from most of
the subsequent analysis.
Figure 1.
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Table 4 shows the estimation results of our statistical model.  In column (1), we specify  f(xi)
as a polynomial of degree 5.  The hypothesis that  = == 0  is not rejected (p = 0.344),
but the hypothesis that  = == = 0  is rejected (p = 0.017).  We therefore conclude
that  f(xi)  can be approximated by a quadratic function.  In column (2), we re-estimate the
model by removing terms higher than the third order.  This equation shows that both   and
are statistically significant.  The implied shape of the relationship between site area and
popularity share is an inverted U-shape.
If  f(xi) = xi +  xi2  and if  is negative,  this function reaches a peak at the point where
f'(xi) = + 2 xi = 0.  Thus, the optimal site size can be estimated by  xi* = - / 2.  This
expression is a non-linear function of the coefficient estimates, and standard errors can be
obtained by the delta method (Greene, 1997).  Using the estimates obtained from column (2),
the optimal site size is  calculated to be about 24,770 sq.m., with a 95 percent confidence
interval of (20,690, 28,860) sq.m.  Of the 128 housing estates, 25 estates have site areas that
fall within the 95 percent confidence interval of the optimal size, 74 estates have site areas that
are below the lower limit, and 29 estates have areas that exceed the upper limit.
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Table 4. Estimation results
(1) (2)
                   Site (a1) 0.6025 0.6623
                           0.1790 2.4920
                Site2 (a2) 0.0027 -0.0134
                              0.0080 -2.9080
                   Site3 (a3) -0.0018           
                               -0.1160           
        Site4 (a4) 6.1900E-05             
                               0.2050           
        Site5 (a5) -6.5900E-07
                                -0.2980
                  Real price 0.3622 0.4580
                              1.1850 1.6250
                    Discount 0.7903 0.8942
                              1.0480 1.2320
              Share of flats 0.2510 0.2601
                               2.7200 2.8600
             Hong Kong Island 7.7246 7.0794
                              2.2290 2.2190
                     Kowloon 12.3044 10.8984
                             5.3030 5.5740
   New Territories with rail 7.8840 7.1840
                               3.5330 3.4450
New Territories without rail    omitted     omitted  
       phase dummy variables        yes         yes 
                        R2 0.4793 0.4655
                           N 128 128
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The effects of the other variables in the model are not difficult to understand.  From Table 4, it
can be seen that more expensive estates are more popular. This is hardly surprising.  All these
subsidized sale flats are sold at a substantial discount of their market value.  Buying a more
expensive unit  therefore  implies  getting  a  bigger  subsidy  in  dollar  terms.  The percentage
discount from market value also has a positive effect on popularity, although the effects of
both price and discount are not statistically significant at conventional levels. Naturally, the
applicants are  more likely to indicate a choice for  housing estates  which have more flats
available for allocation and which are located in the urban areas or along railway lines.  The
coefficients on the “share of flats” variable and on the locational dummy variables are highly
significant.  The  fact  that  these  variables  have  the  expected  effects  on  popularity  share
increases our confidence that the dependent variable is measuring the housing applicants' true
preferences.
The statistical models in Table 4 are estimated with dummy variables for allocation phase.  For
economy of space, the coefficients for these variables are not reported, but they are jointly
significant at the one percent level.
Table 5  shows a  number  of  variations  of  the basic  model  we have estimated to  test  the
robustness of our results.  In column (1), the model is estimated with the outliers (Tin Shing
Court Phase I and Phase II) included in the sample.  Compared to column (2) of Table 4, the
coefficients on the site area variables retain the same signs, indicating an inverted U-shaped
relationship between site area and popularity share.  Notice, however, that the magnitudes of
these coefficients change dramatically, confirming that these two outlier observations have an
unduly large effect on the model estimates (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). 
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In  column (2)  of  Table  5,  we  use  popularity  (Yi)  instead  of  popularity  share  (yi)  as  the
dependent variable.  Most of the results are qualitatively the same as those reported in column
(2) of Table 4.  The implied optimal site size estimated from this model is about 25,800 sq.m.,
very close to the estimate of 24,770 sq.m. obtained earlier.
The relationship between site size and popularity share may be different in urban areas (Hong
Kong Island and Kowloon) than in the non-metropolitan New Territories.  To test whether this
is the case, we introduce interaction terms between the size variables and a dummy variable
for  urban  areas.  Column (3)  of  Table  5  displays  the  results  (the  dependent  variable  is
popularity share).  These interaction terms are jointly insignificant, with a  p-value of 0.236.
Using this interaction model, the implied optimal site area for urban areas is 22,680 sq.m. and
that for the non-metropolitan districts in the New Territories is 27,470 sq.m.  The difference
between these two estimates, however, is not statistically significant (p = 0.314).
If  any  reduction  in  the  amenity  value  of  housing  resulting  from sub-optimal  site  size  is
compensated by a reduction in the real price of flats or by an increase in discount, then the
popularity of an estate will not fall even if site size is sub-optimal.  For our methodology to
work, quality differences resulting from variations in site size must not be incorporated into
the Housing Authority's pricing policies.  We have checked that this is indeed the case.  When
we estimate a regression using the real price as the dependent variable, the coefficients on size
and its square are jointly insignificant, with a p-value of 0.877 (the other independent variables
in this  regression are  dummy variables  for  location and for  allocation phase).   A similar
regression using percentage discount from market value as the dependent variable indicates
that site size is unrelated to discount (p = 0.225).   We also re-estimate our basic model by
excluding price  and discount from the set  of  independent variables.   The resulting model
coefficients shown in column (4) of Table 5 are quite similar to the original model coefficients
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shown in column (2) of Table 4. The optimal site size implied by column (4) is about 25,710
sq.m., again very close to the original estimate of 24,770 sq.m.
Table 5. Estimation results (with different model specifications)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
                   site (a1) 0.123 371.509 5583781 0.705
                                0.908 1.826 1.706 2.616
 site2 (a2) -0.002 -7.199 -0.010 -0.014
                               -1.029 -2.082 -1.867 -2.903
                  urban*site                   0.186
                                                  0.296
             urban*( site2)                  -0.006
                                                 -0.572
                  real price 0.399 385.080 0.414
                              1.523 2.373 1.381
                    discount 0.746 940.709 0.813
                              1.024 2.151 1.047
              share of flats 0.285        0.258 0.239
                               3.158          2.778 2.917
             number of flats           2.595  
                                         2.789
             Hong Kong Island 7.212 3640.846 7.257 9.841
                              2.303 1.580 1.060 2.593
                     Kowloon 11.025 5835.521 11.370 13.387
                             4.546 4.193 1.941 5.053
   New Territories with rail 7.973 5075.404 7.841 7.644
                               3.459 2.738 3.577 3.334
New Territories without rail  Omitted  omitted   omitted omitted
       phase dummy variables       Yes      yes      yes     yes
                        R2  0.4167 0.6107 0.4734 0.4441
                           N 130 128 128 128
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V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the optimal site area of planned high-density
housing development in Hong Kong. We argue that both tiny and excessively large housing
estates are undesirable from the perspective of the households. In the private housing market,
market concentration produced by large development sites may cause housing units within
larger housing estates to command higher prices,  although this does not necessarily imply
greater amenity value for such units. Conventional hedonic pricing technique cannot identify
the optimal site  area,  because it  cannot  distinguish  whether  its  effect  on housing price is
caused by amenity value or by market power. In this paper, we propose to get around this
problem by using a data set containing the choice of applicants for publicly subsidized sale
housing units in Hong Kong. After controlling other variables, our estimation does show an
inverted U-shaped relationship between site area and popularity of the housing estates among
applicants. We conclude that the optimal housing site area is about 24,770 sq.m., with a 95
percent confidence interval between 20,690 sq.m. and 28,860 sq.m. Only about 20 percent of
the surveyed estates fall within this interval. We have tried out different specifications and
variations of our model but the estimation results have not substantially departed from our
initial estimates.
Identification of optimal site  area of public housing estates has obvious relevance for  the
planning of public housing developments.  Although the size of a development site is often
constrained by topographical factors, planners do have a choice in determining the scale of the
housing  development.  Planners  are  generally  in  favor  of  comprehensively  planned
development (Knox, 1991). However, our study shows that comprehensive development does
not  always  produce  housing  that  people  prefer:  larger  is  not  necessarily  better.   More
importantly, this study yields a quantitative estimate of an optimal site area of 25,000 sq.m.
that may serve as a useful benchmark for planning considerations.
Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics 
Submitted October 1999; Revised January 2000
17
MS # 1771 Optimal Housing Site
Our findings also have relevance for the planning and development of  private housing land.
Two caveats have to be borne in mind, however.  First, this study is based on the preferences
of public housing applicants, who may not be as well off as private housing homebuyers.  To
the extent that tastes for large versus small housing estates differ systematically by income
class, the optimal site size for private housing development may be different from the estimate
obtained in this study.  For example, private housing estates often include better ancillary
facilities than do public housing.  In this case, the optimal private lot size may be larger than
our estimate.  Second, in the private housing market, the size of the development site may
affect the degree of competition in the localized property market, as well as the amenity value
of the housing estate.  To the extent that larger sites reduces market competition by reducing
the number of competing housing developments in a localized area, the optimal site size for
private developments should be less than our estimate of 25,000 sq.m.
To  elaborate  on  this  second point,  consider  the  effects  of  land  use  planning  policies  on
competition in the property market.  It is argued that in the United States zoning leads to a
local monopolistic supply of land and housing, thus increasing land and housing prices above
competitive equilibrium levels (e.g., Ohls, Weisberg, & White, 1974; Bramley, Bartlett, &
Lambert, 1995; Carroll, 1988; Peiser, 1990). Inter-urban differences in housing prices due to
varying  zoning  restrictions  could be  as  high as  fifty  percent  (Hamilton,  1978).  Similarly,
Thorson (1996) argues that local communities with stronger monopoly power tend to have
higher housing prices than do fragmented neighborhoods.  In Hong Kong, as the monopoly
supplier of new housing land, the government has been criticized for selling too many large
housing sites during the property booms in the early 1990s (Hong Kong Consumer Council,
1996).3  It  is  argued  that  these  sites  meet  the  planning  objectives  for  comprehensive
3 Between 1993 and 1995, 45 housing sites were sold by the government. Over half of them comprised a land area
of 5,000 sq.m. and 17 of them over 10,000 sq.m.  The Consumer Council stated that there was a strong barrier to
entry by smaller developers as most of these large sites were purchased by the dominant developers (Hong Kong
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development but their scales deter the participation of smaller developers.4  This policy is said
to help further sustain the dominance of the larger developers, as the property industry in Hong
Kong is regarded as a de facto oligopoly5 (Dodwell, 1999; Enright, Scott, & Dodwell, 1997).
Suggestions  were  made to  reduce the  size  of  government auctioned land with a  view to
stimulating  competition  (Hong  Kong  Consumer  Council,  1996;  Hong  Kong  Government,
1994).  It is by no means clear that large development lots necessarily reduce competition.  For
example, resale  housing units  may be good substitutes  for  new housing units  so  that  the
property market may remain highly competitive even though the market for new housing units
is  dominated by a few large developers (Carleton & Gertler,  1989).  In any case, even if
market power is a valid concern, dividing the land into very small plots is not costless because
the quality of a housing development bears an inverted U-shaped relationship with its size.
There is  a trade-off between achieving greater  amenity value and promoting more intense
competition.6
Dividing new housing land into “manageable size” may promote competition in the housing
market. Amalgamating diverse plots of land into a “comprehensive development site” may
improve the amenity value of the housing development.  The fundamental question is,  How
much land area should an optimal site take up? At present, decisions are based upon intuitive
judgement taking into account physical conditions, urban design, road layouts of the subject
site, and so on. There is no systematic approach to answering the question. Our estimation here
has contributed to offer a tentative answer in informing professional practices.  Obviously,
some  adjustments  have  to  be  made  when  we  apply  the  answer  to  private  housing  land
development. Nonetheless, as our estimated optimal site area gives the highest amenity value
Consumer Council, 1996:2-8 and Annex 4).
4 In the US, high capital outlays and long payback for planned unit developments are also expected to drive out
smaller and independent developers (Tomioka & Tomioka, 1984:166). 
5 Seven developers supplied 70 percent of all the new housing units.  Fifty-five percent came from four developers
and one developer consistently produced 25 percent of the market  share during 1991 and 1994 (Hong Kong
Consumer Council, 1996). 
6 See Williamson (1968) for a parallel discussion in the context of the theory of the firm.
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of  housing,  we  believe  it  serves  as  a  reasonable  first  benchmark  for  the  government  to
consider in its future disposal of urban housing land. 
-END-
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